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“ONLY CONNECT”: TOWARD A UNIFIED 
MEASUREMENT PROJECT 
DAVID F. LEVI† 
MITU GULATI†† 
In his early twentieth century novel, Howard’s End, the English 
author E. M. Forster used the phrase “Only Connect” as an epigraph. 
Later one finds this passage: “Only connect! . . . Only connect the 
prose and the passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will 
be seen at its height. Live in fragments no longer.”1 We do not 
advocate that academic scholars of the judiciary and judges should be 
joined in passion or exaltation, although love might not be entirely 
out of the question—particularly love of justice and a better system of 
adjudication. But we do suggest that they would do well to “live in 
fragments no longer.” Hence, the papers and comments which follow, 
the product of a conference of judges, political scientists, and law 
professors, convened at Duke University School of Law. 
For many years, academics and judges have been thinking about 
the judiciary from their individual scholarly or practical perspectives. 
The scholars attempt to evaluate the structural, institutional, and 
behavioral factors that influence judicial decisions and the overall 
efficacy and impact of the legal system, while the judges study ways to 
become more efficient in the face of increasing caseloads while 
improving consistency and overall fairness. Both groups place a high 
value on empirical studies, and yet, for the most part, the scholars and 
the judges speak past one another, either strongly disagreeing or 
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simply unaware of what is most important to the other group. This is 
unfortunate because academics and the judges they study should have 
much to say to one another and much to gain from finding common 
ground. For example, take the recent research on the sentencing 
practices of federal trial judges. Academic scholars, seeking to 
examine patterns in sentencing practices, have been frustrated by the 
unavailability of judge-specific identifiers in the data.2 The judiciary, 
however, is understandably reluctant to release judge-specific 
identifiers when the sole purpose of the scholarship appears designed 
to establish that, for example, Republican appointees hand out stiffer 
sentences than their Democratic colleagues, and when the release of 
such information could subject judges to external pressure, perhaps 
from the electorate or the legislature. The stalemate is regrettable not 
only because the topic of sentencing itself is important, nor only 
because the nature of decisionmaking in this area lends itself to 
empirical study, but also because judges want to know whether they 
are fair and consistent sentencers and how their sentences compare to 
other judges in the same justice systems. Surely there is a middle 
ground here, where both sides can benefit from cooperation and 
conversation.3 
The general trend in recent years, however, has been away from 
the conversation and cooperation among judges and academics. As a 
general matter, the gap between academic writing and judicial 
reading has become more pronounced as legal scholarship has 
become increasingly technical and specialized, with an emphasis on 
theoretical and empirical approaches to law over analysis of 
particular cases and developments in legal doctrine.4 In our 
experience, most judges believe that the vast majority of academic 
writing, particularly academic writing focused on the judiciary, is of 
no practical use to them.5 They lament that law review articles 
 
 2. See, e.g., Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing 
Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 717 
(2008). 
 3. One easy partial solution might be to release individual judge information from larger 
courts without the names of the individual judges. 
 4. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 207–10 (2008) (describing the progression 
from a legal academy contributing pedagogical and practical-based scholarship to the current 
day reshaped “modern style of academic law” influenced largely by the social sciences and the 
critical legal studies movement). 
 5. One such judge, Judge Harry Edwards, former Chief Judge of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and former professor at the University of Michigan 
Law School, contends that judges and others engaged in the practical application of the law 
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provide little help in understanding complex and developing areas of 
the law. They believe that there was a golden age when the best 
academics waited eagerly for the opinions of the appellate courts, 
poised to expound in treatises and in law reviews upon the brilliance 
and craft of the judicial authors. Judges tend to find interdisciplinary 
work irrelevant; and they resent what they see as the obsession of 
some empiricists with proving that judges determine case outcomes 
based on their judicial philosophies, which the political scientists insist 
on calling “political bias.” The scholars cry “gotcha” whenever a 
correlation between belief or experience or gender or the like can be 
made to case outcomes. To most judges, this literature seems 
misguided in part because it misses the vast majority of cases that are 
decided unanimously by judges of all shapes and sizes, in part because 
it states the obvious point that political selection processes for judges 
will select judges who sometimes decide cases differently in somewhat 
predictable ways, and in part because it misses the effort that 
conscientious judges make to overcome preconceptions by listening 
to and learning from the advocates and evidence in the case. Our 
adversary system and much of our procedure is based on the view 
that judges and jurors have preconceptions but that reasonable and 
fair outcomes are possible when the parties have extended 
opportunities to make their case and be heard. 
If what we have described is the common view of judges, and if 
the criticism leveled at the academic literature has some force, it is 
also mistaken in many respects, as the papers submitted for this 
conference demonstrate. For example, Professors Brennan, Epstein, 
and Staudt’s paper, Economic Trends and Judicial Outcomes: A 
Macrotheory of the Court, is an interesting piece of empirical history 
and analysis.6 Moving away from the tendency in the empirical 
literature to focus on constitutional matters, these scholars turn their 
lens on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the tax area.7 Looking 
to tax opinions during the periods 1912–1929 and 1930–1940, the 
 
“have little use for” the scholarship generated by the academy. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing 
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1992). 
He has described academic writing as unhelpful, overly impractical, and narrowly focused. See 
id. He has accused law schools of “abandon[ing] their proper place by emphasizing abstract 
theory at the expense of practical scholarship.” Id. at 34. 
 6. Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial 
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2009). 
 7. Id. at 1195. This project builds on the prior work by Professors Staudt and Epstein in 
the tax-judging area. See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Weidenbeck, The Ideological 
Component of Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797 (2007). 
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authors discover that the Justices may have been influenced by the 
economic condition of the country and that the Court began ruling 
more favorably to the government as the economy deteriorated in the 
1930s.8 These scholars contend that in times of severe economic 
distress, as in a time of war, the Court appears to defer more to the 
government.9 By contrast, when the downturns are but short-term, 
the Court appears more willing to express its approval and 
disapproval.10 Whatever criticism might be made of the analysis, the 
attempt to describe the historical context of decisionmaking and to 
establish changing economic conditions as an important part of the 
context in which the Court then operated is of considerable interest 
to judges and scholars alike. 
Using the tax data set that Professors Epstein and Staudt 
created, Professors Brudney and Ditslear look at how legislative 
history and canons of construction are used in tax law as compared 
with employment law decisions.11 This article extends their prior 
empirical work on canons of construction.12 They find that the use of 
canons of construction, legislative history, and deference to expert 
bodies are quite different in the tax and workplace law areas.13 Here is 
the golden age revived in empirical dress; these scholars are looking 
closely at doctrines and decisional methodology over a long period of 
time and over many cases.14 Most judges would welcome this scrutiny 
and might well learn something important from it. 
Professor Shepherd turns her attention to an area often shunned 
by scholars, the state high courts, and measures the effect of 
institutional structure on decisionmaking.15 Her study finds that, in 
many cases, judges appointed by governors or state legislatures are 
less independent than judges who are elected, thereby questioning 
 
 8. Brennan et al., supra note 6, at 1196. 
 9. Id. at 1208. 
 10. Id. at 1195. 
 11. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: 
Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231 
(2009). 
 12. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest 
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 44 (2005) (examining the Supreme Court’s reliance 
on the canons of construction in workplace law). 
 13. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 11, at 1235–37. 
 14. The authors rely on two Supreme Court datasets, consisting of nearly 160 tax cases and 
600 cases involving federal workplace statutes accumulated over a thirty-nine-year period. See 
id. at 1235. 
 15. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589 (2009). 
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conventional wisdom regarding judicial election versus appointment 
systems.16 This article is the third in a line of important articles by 
Professor Shepherd showing that judges in systems where retention 
or reappointment is an issue tend to shape their decisions, not as a 
function of their personal politics, but as a function of the politics of 
those who are deciding on whether the judge will continue in office.17 
The implications of such a study for law reform are significant. 
Professors Rachlinski and Guthrie, two of the leading scholars in 
the emerging field of behavioral law and economics, collaborate with 
Judge Wistrich to examine the behavior of administrative law 
judges.18 This type of collaborative study between judges and 
academics is precisely what we hope to encourage. We cannot take 
credit for bringing together this team because they have already put 
together an impressive body of experimental research on psychology 
and judging.19 In their project for this Symposium, they find that these 
specialized judges are no more deliberative decisionmakers than their 
generalist counterparts.20 Professor Baum, one of the giants in the 
judicial studies field, responds by drawing insights from his current 
research on various types of judicial specialization.21 
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner, building on two prior 
articles on state court judges,22 propose measures that can be used to 
rank the relative performances of courts and judges.23 They ask 
whether, in the context of organizations like the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce that issue annual rankings of the state courts based on 
 
 16. Id. at 1594. 
 17. See Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. 
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=997491; Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 629 
(2009). 
 18. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinkski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: 
An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009). 
 19. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001). 
 20. Rachlinski et al., supra note 18, at 1480. 
 21. Lawrence Baum, Response, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1667 (2009). 
 22. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical 
Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 57 (2009); Stephen J. Choi, 
Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians?: The Uncertain Empirical Case for 
an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2009) 
(manuscript at 2–4), available at http://ssrn.com/ id=1008989. 
 23. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information 
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009). 
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opaque measures (such as surveys of lawyers), there is utility in 
constructing countermeasures that use public information and 
transparent methodology.24 To the extent that the public and 
transparent measures differ from those constructed using opaque (but 
supposedly superior) measures, this can potentially force those 
producing the opaque measures to reveal the reasons for the 
differences in rankings.25 
Professors Cross and Lindquist squarely address the topic of the 
conference—that of devising measures to evaluate judges and 
justice.26 They take on the question of whether the measures 
employed by Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner in the state court 
context can be improved upon, specifically within the context of the 
federal courts of appeals.27 Cross and Lindquist suggest that 
significant improvements can be made, such as using information 
embedded in reversal rates.28 
Professors George and Guthrie, building on their prior work 
questioning the optimality of the U.S. Supreme Court’s institutional 
design,29 evaluate whether the Court should be restructured in the 
image of the courts of appeals—for example, in three-judge panels 
with the opportunity for en banc hearing.30 
Professor Knight steps back from the specifics of the various 
empirical projects to grapple with the big picture question of where 
empirical scholarship on the courts should now go.31 Drawing on his 
classic book with Professor Lee Epstein, The Choices Justices Make;32 
Judge Posner’s recent book, How Judges Think;33 and the 
 
 24. Id. at 1317–18. 
 25. Id. at 1318. 
 26. Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383 (2009). 
 27. Id. at 1384–85. 
 28. See id. at 1405 (suggesting that the reversal rate is “an important metric . . . that may 
yield insight into the quality of circuit court judges”). 
 29. See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Essay, “The Threes”: Re-Imagining Supreme 
Court Decisionmaking, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1825, 1830 (2008). We thought it was delightful to see 
how the judges in the audience were far more willing to consider institutional reforms of the 
courts, even the high citadel, than the attending law professors. 
 30. Tracey George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the 
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1465 (2009). 
 31. Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decision-
making?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531(2009). 
 32. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
 33. RICHARD POSNER, supra note 4. 
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jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart,34 Professor Knight wrestles with the 
ultimate question of whether empirical studies of the courts 
adequately measure the correct components of judicial 
decisionmaking.35 He advocates for a movement beyond a simple 
review of a case’s disposition to explain judicial choice, and toward 
the development of more nuanced measures of judicial opinions—
based upon the reasons given in the decision.36 
Finally, Professor Ramseyer’s study of the Japanese Supreme 
Court from 1990–2000 examines how that Court might have been 
affected by the loss of power by the Liberal Democratic Party in the 
mid-1990s.37 Professor Ramseyer uses this opportunity to meditate 
upon the connection between an independent judiciary and the 
consequent freedom a judge has to apply political preferences: “Were 
courts not independent . . . judges could not costlessly indulge their 
political biases. And if they could not indulge them at low cost, they 
would not indulge them often. That they act politically in political 
cases simply reflects their essential independence from incumbent 
politicians.”38  
Professor Ramseyer’s study of judicial independence, which 
builds upon his large body of prior research on the Japanese judiciary 
and specifically on judicial independence,39 should be of great interest 
to judges. Indeed, there is probably no topic of greater importance 
and interest to judges in the United States than judicial 
independence. The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
annually speaks to the connection between the conditions of judges’ 
employment, specifically their pay, and judicial independence.40 
Justices and judges testify and write op-ed pieces on the importance 
 
 34. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
 35. Knight, supra note 31, at 1532–33. 
 36. Id. at 1548 (arguing for “a more nuanced measure of the substantive content of the law 
produced by the case”). 
 37. J. Mark Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences: The 
Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, 58 DUKE L.J. 1557 (2009). 
 38. Id. at 1559. 
 39. E.g., J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case for Managed Judges: Learning 
from Japan After the Political Upheaval of 1993, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1879 (2006); J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect on Judicial Recruitment and 
Retention: Japan in the 1990s, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 329 (2007); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. 
Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001). 
 40. E.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2008 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2008year-endreport.pdf. 
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of judicial independence. Judicial conferences are devoted to this 
topic. A joint conference of the American Law Institute and The 
Sandra Day O’Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary at 
Georgetown University Law Center41 enabled many eminent lawyers 
and judges, including Justices O’Connor and Breyer, to take a 
thorough look at judicial independence. 42 
Perhaps as an indication of the unnecessary division between 
academic work on the judiciary and the very judges who might 
benefit from such work, none of the published materials reference the 
substantial academic literature on the importance of the independent 
judge in the common law tradition to economic development, 
political stability, and democratic values. In the past decade, one of 
the areas of academic debate in the fields of finance and development 
has been the relationship between law and finance. This is an age-old 
question—whether a robust rule of law can lead to increased 
economic growth.43 But what has been noteworthy about the modern 
version of this debate has been its focus on empirical evidence, 
specifically, whether common law courts result in greater economic 
growth because of the independence that judges are given within that 
system. Although one can quarrel with the precise causal mechanisms 
(and many do), most seem to agree that this is an interesting question 
and that common law systems come out on top under a variety of 
tests. The premise that the independence granted to judges under the 
common law system is key to producing the kind of justice system 
that induces growth should be of great interest to judges particularly 
because in some of the studies job security and protection of judicial 
salaries are deemed important to creating the conditions for this 
growth. Yet, we believe that most judges are unaware of this 
substantial body of academic work even though it is well known to 
policymakers and institutions like the World Bank.44 In sum, whatever 
 
 41. This was the first in a series of conferences organized by Georgetown’s Sandra Day 
O’Connor Project to examine judicial independence. 
 42. The proceedings of the conferences were later published in the Fall 2008 issue of 
Dædalus, titled “On Judicial Independence.” See DÆDALUS, Fall 2008. 
 43. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 8 (1990); see also Mancur Olson, Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why 
Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 20 (1996) (observing the 
connection between high rates of growth and the quality of economic policies and institutions). 
 44. See Daniel Klerman & Paul J. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence 
from 18th Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (“There is a growing body of 
evidence that differences in the quality of legal systems can explain . . . variation in financial 
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its shortcomings, there exists a body of academic literature discussing 
judicial decisionmaking, judicial independence, and the institutional 
design of judiciaries that judges do not know about, even though 
there is much in this scholarship that would be of great value to them. 
On the other side, academics would benefit from more judicial 
comment upon their work. As Judge Edwards puts it, understanding 
how judges think “requires considering the way those who perform 
the activity understand it.”45 Similarly, judges have a unique 
understanding of how courts are organized and operate, and how 
cases are decided and managed, that could be quite useful to scholars 
interested in institutional design. Finally, judges might be helpful in 
moving scholarship toward questions of great practical importance 
and away from the somewhat tired search for correlations between 
judges’ so-called politics—a potentially misleading term—and the 
decisions they reach. Judge Posner offers his own recommendations 
for future research in an interview in this Issue.46 The potential for the 
judge-subjects and academic-evaluators to have a mutually beneficial 
relationship just needs an opportunity to be fully realized. 
The Duke Law Journal Conference on Measuring Judges and 
Justice, the conference that precipitated the articles in this Issue, was 
an attempt to provide that opportunity. The conference was an 
outgrowth of discussion in a seminar class we taught on the study of 
judicial behavior. Our students believed that it would be useful for 
judges and those doing research on judicial behavior to come together 
to discuss and debate judicial measurement and institutional design; 
and we were willing to put their theory to the test. Our academic 
guests at the conference were all preeminent scholars whose work sits 
at the intersection of traditional law and the modern empirical inquiry 
into judicial behavior. Our judicial guests were all distinguished 
members of the judiciary from both the federal and state courts at 
both the trial and appellate levels. To us, the results were exceptional. 
 
development and economic growth . . . .”); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic 
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 507 (2001). 
 45. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1335, 1365 (1998); see also Stephen Breyer, Serving America’s Best Interests, DÆDALUS, 
Fall 2008, at 139, 140 (“Ultimately, only the judge, not third parties, can understand his or her 
own thought processes.”); David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, Judging Measures, 77 UMKC L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 22, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (advocating for 
judicial involvement in the measurement project as a means to determine the appropriate 
characteristics to measure and the best ways to measure them). 
 46. Interview, A Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807, 1819–23 
(2009). 
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The papers generated thoughtful and illuminating panel discussions 
among the authors, their judge-subjects, and other academics. 
Though their approaches differed, the participants generally agreed 
that despite the law’s emphasis on rules as constraints, discretion and 
judgment permeate the judicial process. Their discussions centered 
not on whether one could measure exercises of discretion 
quantitatively, but on how one might best capture the complexity of 
legal decisions and help improve decisionmaking through 
measurement. Moreover, as the responses in this Issue suggest, the 
ideas and discussions were anything but exhausted by the end of the 
Symposium. This Symposium and this Issue are just the beginning of 
an ongoing discussion and debate begun in the hope that we will “live 
in fragments no longer.” 
